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Fabricated Quotations-Facts or
Falsehoods? Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Libel suits tend to excite the passion of the litigants as well as to
generate enthusiasm among observers. Perhaps no other area of law
brings constitutional protection of institutions into such intimate con-
flict with deeply felt personal outrage. The first amendment stands
as a sentinel against repression of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. However, it is also a barrier to vindication of honor by
those who are maligned by the falsehoods and scurrilous imputations
of others.
In less civil times, public lies and attacks on personal character
frequently resulted in duels. The combatants attempted to defend
their reputations or prove the validity of their accusations by force of
arms. Such duels now occur in courtrooms with only slightly less
solemnity and formality. The atmosphere is invariably acrimonious
because of the deeply rooted sense of personal outrage felt by the
plaintiff and the defense of freedom of speech asserted by the press.
Against such a background it would seem unlikely that a case
could arise in which free press advocates believe that a court is too
vigorous in its enforcement of this constitutional guarantee. How-
ever, in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.' the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently decided a case which some journalists be-
lieve condones distortion and alteration of quotations obtained in in-
terviews. The decision is caught in the cross fire between common
law libel and constitutional principles.
1. 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. See Henry, The Right to Fake Quotes, TIME, Aug. 21, 1989, at 49.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Concerns
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan3 the Supreme Court held that
the first and fourteenth amendment safeguards for freedom of
speech and press apply to libel actions brought by public officials. To
give "'breathing space'-4 for free expression, the Court declared
that erroneous statements must be protected because they are "inevi-
table in free debate."' 5 The rule enunciated by the Court prohibits
recovery by public officials for defamatory falsehoods "unless [they]
prove[] that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."
The rule also applies to persons who, because of their position or
some activity by which they voluntarily inject themselves into public
controversy, are subject to public interest or fame.' In Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, the plaintiff conceded he was a public figure
required to prove the defendants were motivated by actual malice.8
The standard for proving actual malice is one of clear and convinc-
ing evidence.9
B. Statutory Basis
The California Civil Code defines libel as "a false and un-
privileged publication by writing . ..which exposes any person to
hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be
shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his
occupation." 10 The California Supreme Court has appended to this
definition the declaration of the United States Supreme Court that
"'[tihe sine qua non of recovery for defamation. . is the existence
of a falsehood.' "" The requirement of falsehood is based on the pro-
tection accorded by the first amendment.12
3. 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
4. Id. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
5. Id. at 271-72.
6. Id. at 279-80.
7. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (Harlan, J.); Car-
son v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976).
8. 881 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989).
9. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
11. Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 259, 721 P.2d 87, 90,
228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208 (1986), cert.'denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987) (quoting Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1974)).
12. Id.
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C. Decisional Background
1. Supreme Court Decisions
Although no opinion directly on point was controlling, the Masson
court was not without guidance. In Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connaughton the Supreme Court held that "a public figure
plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from profes-
sional standards."'" The Court indicated that election campaign cov-
erage presents the strongest kind of case for applying the actual mal-
ice standard. 4 However, even in such cases, the press does not have
absolute immunity, and "[if a false and defamatory statement is
published with knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the
truth, the public figure may prevail."' 5
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. the
Court found "a significant difference between proof of actual malice
and mere proof of falsity."' 6 It construed the language adopted by
13. 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2684 (1989). The Court affirmed an opinion of the Sixth
Circuit upholding a district court libel verdict against the Journal News of Hamilton,
Ohio. An unsuccessful candidate for Municipal Judge claimed that a story which ap-
peared in the Journal News during the course of an election campaign was false and was
published with actual malice. The story accused the plaintiff of "dirty tricks" in connec-
tion with a bribery investigation of the incumbent judge's Director of Court Services. Id.
at 2682.
The Court expressly rejected a professional standards test for libel of public figures. It
had previously considered whether libel of public figures could be found if publication
was shown to be "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from
the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publish-
ers." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (Harlan, J.) A majority
of the Court in Butts disagreed with such a professional standards test and supported
adherence to the'New York Times actual malice test. In Connaughton, the Court left no
doubt as to its disapproval of any such test. "Today, there is no question that public
figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard and not by the profes-
sional standards rule, which never commanded a majority of this Court." Connaughton,
109 S. Ct. at 2685.
14. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. at 2695. The Court underscored the rationale behind
the New York Times actual malice rule by noting that the right to elect public officials is
an essential element of democracy and its value is dependent on an informed electorate.
The actual malice rule provides a protected zone in which the press may investigate the
candidates and report its findings and its opinions. "Vigorous reportage of political cam-
paigns is necessary for the optimal functioning of democratic institutions and central to
our history of individual liberty." Id. at 2696.
15. Id. at 2696. The Court did not suggest that application of the standard is any
less demanding in the case of a public figure not engaged in a political contest, merely
that the values constitutionally protected by the actual malice rule are at their zenith in
such circumstances.
16. 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984). The Court upheld a decision of the First Circuit
reversing the district court's judgment for the plaintiff. Bose Corp. claimed that Consum-
ers Union had published an article disparaging a Bose loudspeaker system. Id. at 486-87.
the defendant as a rational interpretation of an event which was am-
biguous and difficult to describe. 17 The Court held that the evidence
of error was not sufficient to show actual malice. Rather, it was "the
sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust
debate.""'
In Time, Inc. v. Pape the Court held that failure to indicate that
quotations were allegations contained in a complaint did not consti-
tute "'falsification' sufficient in itself to sustain a jury finding of 'ac-
tual malice.' "I" The article gave the impression that the quoted
passages were conclusions of a federal commission. However, the
Court stated that the writer's interpretation was arguably a miscon-
ception. It "amounted to the adoption of one of a number of possible
rational interpretations of a document that bristled with
ambiguities. 20
2. Appellate Court Decisions
Three federal circuit courts of appeal have addressed the problem
of inaccurate quotations. The Third Circuit, in Dunn v. Gannett New
York Newspapers, Inc.,2 determined that a Spanish to English
translation may have mischaracterized the plaintiff's comments.
However, the court held that the translation was a "rational inter-
pretation of remarks that bristled with ambiguities."22
The company presented evidence that the article falsely stated that the Bose system
caused musical instruments to seem enlarged in size, to move, and to wander around the
room. Id. at 493. The Court explained how the question of falsity relates to the New
York Times standard. "The burden of proving 'actual malice' requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his
statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his
statement." Id. at 511 n.30 (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 512.
18. Id. at 513.
19. 401 U.S. 279, 289 (1979). The Court upheld the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals which had reversed a district court's directed verdict for Time. Pape had ac-
cused Time of libel because of a story in its weekly magazine which reported on a docu-
ment issued by the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The article included a
description of the apprehension of a black Chicagoan by the name of James Monroe.
Monroe, according to the published description, was abused by Pape, a Chicago detec-
tive, who was involved in the apprehension. The description was taken directly from the
Commission's report which the challenged magazine article quoted extensively. However,
the article failed to indicate that the description of abuse suffered by Monroe was based
on allegations in a complaint filed by Monroe rather than on the Commission's findings.
Id. at 280-82.
20. Id. at 290.
21. 833 F.2d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 1987). The court sustained the district court's sum-
mary judgment for the defendant. The Mayor of Elizabeth City, New Jersey alleged that
a Spanish language newspaper headline was libelous which, in translation, stated that the
Mayor referred to Hispanics as "pigs." The Spanish word "cerdos," which the parties
agreed translates as "pigs" in English, was enclosed by single quotation marks. Id. at 448
n.1, 450.
22. Id. at 452.
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In Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche the Second Circuit held that publi-
cation can constitute reckless disregard of truth if a passage can be
independently verified and there is "convincing indicia of unreliabil-
ity."'23 The court found the published quotation milder and less of-
fensive than what was actually said. The modifications "did not in-
crease the defamatory impact or alter the substantive content.1 24
Since the reliability of the more offensive original language had been
established, the court held that the publisher was not liable for hav-
ing toned it down. 5
The Seventh Circuit dealt with the question of fabricated quota-
tions in Carson v. Allied News Co.26 It held that the plaintiff was
entitled to a jury determination on the actual malice question be-
cause of "wholly imagined but supposedly precisely quoted conversa-
tions."27 The court stated, "In the catalogue of responsibilities of
journalists . . . must be a canon that a journalist does not invent
quotations and attribute them to actual persons. 2 s
3. California Court Decisions
The California Supreme Court considered the question of whether
fabricated quotations may be defamatory in Baker v. Los Angeles
Herald Examiner.29 The court noted that the defendant author had
23. 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday &
Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977). The court reversed a district court judgment for the plaintiff.
Hotchner alleged that he was libeled in a book published by Doubleday & Company,
Inc. in which the author described the plaintiff in derogatory terms. Doubleday and the
writer were accused of altering a quotation attributed to Ernest Hemingway in which a
negative opinion of Hotchner was expressed. Id. at 912. The court found that Doubleday
had no suspicion that the conversation described in the book was fabricated and con-
firmed with the author his account of it which appeared in the original Spanish language
edition of the book. Id. at 914.
24. Id. at 914. The evidence showed that the quotation attributed to Hemingway
was fictionalized in that it did not recite the original conversation precisely. The pub-
lished version quoted Hemingway as saying about Hotchner, "'I don't really trust him,
though.'" Id. at 912. According to the original Spanish-language version of the book,
Hemingway actually said, "'[Hotchner is] dirty and a terrible ass-licker. There's some-
thing phony about him. I wouldn't sleep in the same room with him.'" Id. at 914.
25. Id.
26. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). The court reversed the district court's summary
judgment for the defendant. Carson alleged, inter alia, that the writer fabricated quota-
tions contained in an article published in National Insider. The article claimed to depict
conversations which had taken place between Carson and executives of the National
Broadcasting Company. Id. at 212.
27. Id. at 213.
28. Id.
29. 42 Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), cert. denied, 749 U.S.
1032 (1987). Baker claimed he had been libeled by a column written for the Herald
clearly qualified the ostensible quotation by introducing it as "his
'impression.' "30 A hypothetical conversation was considered a valid
journalistic method of conveying the writer's message. 31 To deter-
mine whether a reader would reasonably understand the author's im-
pression to be opinion rather than fact, the court found it necessary
to examine both the "language of the statement and the context in
which it was written and received." 32
In Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. the Second District Court
of Appeal stated that it is libel to ascribe falsely to a person a state-
ment which has "the same damaging effect as a defamatory state-
ment about him." 3 The court also noted that a false statement of
fact is an essential element of libel and that whether it is present is a
question of law.34 The same court also addressed the matter of quo-
tations in Bindrim v. Mitchell.3" It found that an author was not
necessarily insulated from liability merely because the challenged
work was purportedly fiction. 36 The court held that it was a question
Examiner by Peter Bunzel. In the article Bunzel related his "impression" of a conversa-
tion between Walter Baker and Phil Reeder. Baker was the executive producer and
Reeder was the writer and producer of a television documentary which was the subject of
Bunzel's critical review. The Court of Appeals found the passage defamatory but the
California Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 258-59, 721 P.2d at 89-90, 228 Cal. Rptr. at
208.
30. Id. at 263, 721 P.2d at 92, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
31. Id. at 264, 721 P.2d at 93, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 211. The court discounted the
argument that quoted material is necessarily an accurate account regardless of context.
32. Id. at 269, 721 P.2d at 96, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
33. 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 1132, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 844 (1985). The court re-
versed a trial court's dismissal of a libel action brought by Selleck. The plaintiff claimed
that quotations in an article published in the defendant's magazine were falsely attrib-
uted to him. Id. at 1129, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 841; see also Cameron v. Wernick, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 890, 894 n.2, 60 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105 n.2 (1967) (applying the rule to statements
attributed to the plaintiff which suggested questionable ethics and dishonesty); Kerby v.
Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 213-14, 127 P.2d 577, 581 (1942) (applying
the rule to a letter falsely seeming to have been written by the plaintiff and attributing to
her statements indicating immoral character).
34. Selleck, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1133, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The court concluded
from the context that in this case the article "assert[ed] as a fact that plaintiff made the
statements." Id.; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)
(contrasting the impossibility of false ideas to the constitutional worthlessness of false
facts); Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 422, 450, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 157, 162 (1981) (derogatory implications not libelous in a letter to the editor which
merely expressed opinion); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 600-
01,.552 P.2d 425, 427, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1976) (expressly holding false statement
of fact to be an essential element of libel).
35. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979),
disapproved on other grounds, McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 846 n.9, 727
P.2d 711, 719 n.9, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518, 525-26 n.9 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987). A psychologist claimed he was libeled in a fictional work which depicted a psy-
chologist resembling the plaintiff. Quotations attributed to the fictional psychologist were
alleged to be a false portrayal of the plaintiff. Id. at 69-71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33-35.
36. Id. at 73 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 n.2. The trial court's finding of actual
malice was determined to be supported by evidence that the writer knew what actually
occurred at the encounter replicated in the book and the portrayal was inaccurate. Id. at
[voL 27: 247, 1990] Masson v. New Yorker Magazine
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
for the jury to decide whether a reader "would regard the passages
...complained of as mere fictional embroidering or as reporting
actual language and conduct." 3
III. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson is a former professor of Sanskrit and a
psychoanalyst.3 8 Dr. Kurt Eissler, the Secretary of the Sigmund
Freud Archives, had close dealings with Freud's daughter, Dr. Anna
Freud, before her death in 1982. Masson was Projects Director of
the Freud Archives, slated to become Eissler's successor as Secre-
tary, and selected by Anna Freud to publish her father's complete
letters.39 He was removed from his position with the Archives as a
result of controversy over a paper he presented at Yale University in
1981. Masson claimed that his dismissal was in retaliation for his
public disclosure of his contention that Freud had abandoned the se-
duction theory merely to advance his career.40
Masson was interviewed by Janet Malcolm concerning his termi-
nation. Her two-part article, "Annals of Scholarship," was published
in The New Yorker in December of 1983.41 On November 29, 1984,
Masson filed a diversity action in United States District Court for
the Northern District of California. His complaint against Malcolm,
the New Yorker Magazine, Inc., and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. alleged
that the article defamed him and invaded his privacy. He claimed
72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
37. Id. at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
38. See Blumenthal, Scholars Seek the Hidden Freud in Newly Emerging Letters,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1981, at C1, col. 1; Blumethal, Did Freud's Isolation Lead Him to
Reverse Theory on Neurosis?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1981, at Cl, col. 1. Masson taught
at the University of Toronto and at the University of California at Berkeley. He
presented a number of highly acclaimed papers at psycho-analytical association con-
gresses in the mid-seventies and came to the attention of Dr. Kurt Eissler of the New
York Psychoanalytic Institute who was also Secretary of the Freud Archives.
39. Blumethal, Scholars Seek the Hidden Freud in Newly Emerging Letters, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 18, 1981, at Cl, col. 1.
40. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989).
The seduction theory was a hypothesis advanced by Sigmund Freud which posited that
certain types of mental illness have their origin in childhood sexual abuse.
41. The article contained some 48,500 words and was based on over 1000 pages of
notes and tape transcripts of interviews and conversations between Masson and Malcolm.
It appeared in the December 5 and 12, 1983 issues of The New Yorker. It was later
published in book form by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. under the title In the Freud Archives.
The article and book have no relevant differences with respect to the case and will here-
inafter be referred to simply as the article.
that misquotations in the article "falsely portray[ed] him as egotisti-
cal, vain, and lacking in personal honesty and moral integrity. ' '42
Masson's complaint identified twelve passages which he alleged
were libelous.43 The district court found four of the passages sub-
stantially true and granted a partial summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on August 19, 1986.44 The court subsequently deter-
mined that the remaining eight allegedly libelous passages were "ei-
ther nondefamatory, substantially true, or a rational interpretation
of ambiguous conversations. 45 On August 17, 1987, the court dis-
posed of these allegations by granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.46 The court found that "[n]o clear and convinc-
ing evidence exists that would justify a finding that the writer or the
publishers entertained serious doubts about the truth of the disputed
passages. 47
B. ' The Decision
In a decision authored by Judge Arthur L. Alarcon, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court. 48 The summary judgment was reviewed de novo by the court
applying the standard enunciated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby.4
That standard requires a determination of whether a reasonable jury
could find that the plaintiff had shown actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence.50 The court dealt with Masson's claims in two
parts. First, it reviewed those quotations which Masson alleged Mal-
colm had deliberately fabricated. 51 Then the court addressed those
quotations which Masson contended had been edited in a misleading
manner.
52
42. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal.
1987), affd, 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989). Masson's suit alleged that Malcolm's article
libeled him, that the New Yorker Magazine, Inc., her employer, was liable on a theory of
vicarious liability, and that Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. knew that Masson contested the accu-
racy of the quotations and had published the interview with reckless disregard of the
truth. Id. at 1406.
43. Id. at 1397.
44. Id. The four passages found to be true were not addressed further in the dis-
trict court's published opinion and were not subjects of review on appeal.
45. Id. at 1407; see infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text. The appeals court
analyzed each of these passages in its de novo review of the district court's summary
judgment.
46. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1397.
47. Id. at 1407.
48. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989).
49. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
50. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453 (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255-56).
51. Id.; see infra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
52. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1461; see infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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1. Deliberate Fabrication
Masson argued that a reasonable jury could find actual malice
solely on the basis of evidence which showed that Malcolm deliber-
ately fabricated quotations which she attributed to him.53 He
presented evidence showing that tape recordings of their interviews
did not contain quotations attributed to him, that Malcolm made the
alterations, and that the publisher was warned of these facts. 4 The
court assumed, for purposes of the appeal, that Malcolm deliberately
altered the quotations. However, the court decided that the inten-
tional misquotation alone was insufficient to show actual malice.55
Acknowledging that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth
Circuit had addressed the question, the court drew on several federal
and California cases to summarize its view of the "state of the cur-
rent law governing the defamatory nature of statements ostensibly
ascribed to another person by the use of quotation marks."58 Accord-
ing to the court, although actual malice is inferable where the
quoted language is "wholly the product of the author's imagina-
tion," 57 an author has a limited privilege to "fictionalize quota-
tions."5 8 The court determined that actual malice is not inferable
from fabricated quotations which are (1) "'rational interpretations'
of ambiguous remarks made by the public figure"59 or which (2) "do
not 'alter the substantive content' of unambiguous remarks actually
made by the public figure." 0
The court reviewed the allegedly fabricated quotations individu-
ally and determined that- most of them did not alter the substantive
content of what Masson said. Malcolm quoted Masson as stating
that he changed his middle name from Lloyd to Moussaieff because
53. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453.
54. Id. at 1453-54.
55. Id. at 1454. Since the appeal was from summary judgment, the court assumed
that the facts claimed by Masson were correct, i.e., that the alterations were intentional.
Summary judgment was affirmed on the grounds that even if those facts were true, they
were insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of actual malice.
56. Id. at 1455. The court reviewed Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc.,
833 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1987); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155
Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), disapproved on other grounds, McCoy
v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 846 n.9,.727 P.2d 711, 719 n.9, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518,
525-26 n.9 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
57. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Dunn, 833 F.2d at 452).
60. Id. (quoting Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914).
"'it sounded better.' ""1 The court said it could not "perceive any
substantive difference"6 2 between those words and Masson's re-
corded statement that he made the name change because he "'just
liked it.' "163 Masson was quoted as saying he was, after Freud, "'the
greatest analyst who ever lived.' -64 The court found this quotation
to "reflect[] the substance of Masson's self appraisal."65
The article quoted Masson discussing "'my discovery about the
Schreber case.'"66 The court noted that the words, "my discovery
about the Schreber case" do not appear on the tapes while the
phrase, "I went a step beyond Niederland" does appear on the tapes.
However, the court determined that such a quotation failed to "alter
the substance of Masson's comments."67 Masson was also quoted as
saying, "'Denise worries too much'"68 about his (Masson's) lack of
sensitivity concerning Eissler. Masson's actual comment was "that
he was not personally 'close' to Eissler. ' '6' Noting that Masson's
comment was nonresponsive, the court found that the quotation "did
not constitute a substantive alteration."
Malcolm's article related a conversation in which Masson de-
scribed his perception of the attitudes held by Eissler and Anna
Freud toward him. He was quoted as saying, "'I was like an intel-
lectual gigolo--you get your pleasure from him, but you don't take
him out in public.' "171 Although this characterization was apparently
a complete fabrication, the court determined that it neither substan-
tively altered Masson's actual description nor defamed him because




64. Id. at 1459.
65. Id. The court reached this conclusion by agreeing with the district court that a
number of statements made by Masson were boastful and egotistical. The court referred
to statements by Masson on the interview tapes such as, "'for better or for worse, analy-
sis stands or falls with me now.'" Another statement relied on was, "'[I]t's me and
Freud against the rest of the analytic world .... Not so, it's me. It's me alone.'" Id.
66. Id. at 1460. Masson alleged that this quotation suggested that he was claiming
credit for a discovery actually made by William Niederland. He contended that his con-
versation had made it clear to Malcolm that Niederland made the initial discovery and
he (Masson) merely took Niederland's discovery one step further.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1461. This statement was purportedly made in response to comments by
Masson's girlfriend, Denise Cammell, who was present at one of Malcolm's meetings
with Masson and made some remarks to the effect that Masson was insensitive to the
pain he caused Eissler.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1456-57.
72. Id. at 1457. The court explained that the incremental harm doctrine "measures
the incremental reputational harm inflicted by the challenged statements beyond the
harm imposed by the nonactionable remainder of the publication; if that 'incremental
harm' is determined to be nominal or nonexistent, the statements are dismissed as not
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The court determined that two of the alleged misquotations were
rational interpretations of ambiguous language. Masson had dis-
cussed his view that despite a brilliant mind, Freud lacked the
"'courage to stick with things that he knew were true.' ,,7' The court
found that Malcolm's phrase, "moral cowardice," was a rational in-
terpretation of this view.74 The court also found that Malcom ration-
ally interpreted an ambiguous conversation when she quoted Masson
as saying, "'Eissler would have admitted I was right.' ,,75
When asked about a paper he presented in which he blamed
Freud for what he called the "'sterility of psychoanalysis,' ",76 Mas-
son was quoted as having said, "'I don't know why I put it in.' "77
The court found that this phrase was a rational interpretation and
that it did not substantively alter Masson's actual comments.78 Mal-
colm also quoted Masson as saying that if he had been permitted to
move into Anna Freud's house, it would have been not only "'a
place of scholarship, but it would also have been a place of sex,
women, fun.' ",71 The court considered that this quotation was ac-
ceptable because it was "consistent with Masson's description of his
life style and conception of 'fun.' "80
actionable." Id. at 1458. See also Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 310-311 (2d Cir.
1986) (discussing background and logic of the doctrine); Simmons Ford, Inc v. Consum-
ers Union of United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (first application of
the incremental harm doctrine).
73. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1458.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1461. This statement was purportedly made by Masson as an assertion
that Eissler agreed with Masson's theory that one of Freud's landmark case studies in-
volving castration delusion was tainted because Freud knew the subject was in an asylum
where his attending psychiatrist performed experimental castration experiments. In the
taped conversation reviewed by the court it was unclear whether Masson claimed that
Eissler agreed with this theory or agreed with another statement made by Masson in the
same conversation. The court's view was that since the conversation was ambiguous,
Malcolm's rendition of what Masson said was a rational interpretation.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1459.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1458.
80. Id. Unlike its assessments of the other quotations at issue thi court did not
characterize this statement as a rational interpretation of ambiguous remarks nor did it
find that the quotation failed to substantially alter an unambiguous statement. Instead, it
agreed with the district court that it was "substantially true" even though Masson appar-
ently never said it. Id.
2. Misleading Editing
The court next reviewed Masson's allegations that Malcolm had
edited quotations in a misleading manner. The court relied on the
Supreme Court decision in Time, Inc. v. Pape"" for the test to deter-
mine whether actual malice is inferable from misleading editing. The
test is whether the quotation amounts "'to the adoption of one of a
number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bris-
tled with ambiguities.'"2
Masson claimed that in two separate passages his remarks were
taken out of context. Malcolm misapplied Masson's comment,
"'t]here aren't too many interpretations possible,'-83 associating it
with Masson's Schreber discovery. Malcolm also edited out inter-
viewing qualifiers in Masson's description of Eissler's pressure on
him to keep silent. She juxtaposed "'[b]ecause it is the honorable
thing to do'" with the quotation, "'Well, he had the wrong
man.' "84 The court found that both of these passages were rational
interpretations of conversations that were ambiguous. s5
Having found that actual malice was not inferable from either the
fabricated quotations or those edited in a misleading fashion, the
court concluded that Masson had "failed to present evidence suffi-
cient to support a reasonable jury finding that Malcolm acted mali-
ciously."88 Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment in
favor of defendant Malcolm. The court also found in favor of The
New Yorker Magazine, Inc. and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. on the vicari-
ous liability claim."7 Finally, the court ruled out frivolous claim
sanctions under both federal and state rules,88 holding that, given the
unclear state of the law in California, "Masson made a plausible,
good faith argument that actual malice could be inferred from the
evidence he presented demonstrating that quotations were fictional-
ized in the article."8 9
81. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
82. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1461 (quoting Time, Inc., 401 U.S. at 290).
83. Id. at 1462. Masson claimed that this remark was in reference to his discover-
ies about Freud's abandonment of the seduction theory. See supra notes 40, 66-67, 75
and accompanying text.
84. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1462. Masson's complaint was that deleted material
would have shown that he said he was the wrong man to keep silent for selfish reasons,
but as quoted he appears to be saying that he is the wrong man to expect to do the
honorable thing.
85. Id. at 1462-63.
86. Id. at 1463. Presumably by sufficient evidence the court meant evidence suffi-
cient to meet the clear and convincing standard. See supra notes 49-50 and accompany-
ing text.
87. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1463; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.7 (West Supp. 1988).
89. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1464. The court considered the state of the law unclear in
California because neither state courts nor the Ninth Circuit had determined whether a
finding of actual malice could be based solely on attribution in quotation marks of words
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C. The Dissent0
Judge Alex Kozinski approached the fabrication of quotations
from a completely different perspective. He stated, "Truth is a jour-
nalist's stock in trade. To invoke the right to deliberately distort
what someone else has said is to assert the right to lie in print."9'
The dissent was based on a fundamental disagreement with the ma-
jority concerning the meaning of quotations.9 2 The underlying pre-
mise for Judge Kozinski's view was that "the right to deliberately
alter quotations is not . . . a concomitant of a free press." 93 He was
particularly concerned about application of the rational interpreta-
tion standard to quotations. He asserted, "An unqualified quotation
attributed to a third party is commonly understood to contain no
interpretation; by using quotation marks the writer warrants that she
has interposed no editorial comment, has resolved no ambiguities,
has added or detracted nothing of substance." 94
Quotations are subject to subtle abuse if alteration is permitted.
They may be artfully shaded to influence the perceptions of read-
ers.9 5 They are given greater weight by readers than are paraphrases
because quotations may be used to draw personal conclusions about
the speaker. 96 Injurious words placed in the speaker's own mouth
conceal the writer's interpretative role and thereby deceive the
reader.9  Ultimately, "[b]ecause quotations purport to come directly
from the speaker-free of editorial comment by the writer-they
can have a devastating rhetorical impact and thus carry a serious
potential for harm."9 8
The dissent illustrated the flaw in the majority's test by analyzing
several of the quotations. The rational interpretation standard was
not actually spoken by the plaintiff. For its ruling on the Rule 11 sanctions, the court
relied on its statement of the appropriate legal standard in a prior Ninth Circuit case:
"[W] e are concerned only with whether the complaint asserts a good faith argument...
even if that legal argument may ultimately fail." Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780
F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986). To avoid sanctions, Masson needed only to raise a claim
in good faith that the fabricated quotations were evidence of actual malice. To get to the
jury he had the more difficult task of producing evidence from which a reasonable jury,
applying the clear and convincing standard, could find actual malice.
90. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1464 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1486.
92. Id. at 1464.
93. Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 1465.
95. Id. at 1466.
96. Id. at 1465-66.
97. Id. at 1466.
98. Id. at 1465.
considered enormously broad as applied to the "greatest analyst who
ever lived" quotation. 9 It would allow a statement reasonably con-
strued as reflecting a particular character trait to operate as a li-
cense to fabricate quotations. A writer could use it as a basis for
attributing to a speaker any other statement as long as it reflected
that same trait. 100 This standard wrongly allowed the majority to put
the most benign interpretation on the "intellectual gigolo" quotation,
which the dissent concluded was neither a rational interpretation of
anything said by Masson nor innocuous.' 0'
The majority's acquiescence in the "sex, women, fun" quotation
was viewed by the dissent as a "license to invent quotations on the
basis of what [authors] perceive to be a speaker's character."10 The
dissent also argued that Malcolm radically altered the meaning of
her conversation with Masson when she edited it by juxtaposing
phrases indicating that Masson had said he was "the wrong man" to
do the honorable thing.'03 Such selective editing was viewed as in-
consistent with respectable journalism, and its acceptability to the
majority indicated an absence of functional boundaries for the ra-
tional interpretation test. 04
The dissent distinguished the cases relied upon by the majority. It
asserted that the decision was "in conflict with that of every other
circuit that has addressed the issue." 05 The dissent found Dunn in-
apposite because the problems inherent in translation from a foreign
language were not present in this case. 0 6 The dissent also distin-
guished Hotchner, noting substantial dissimilarities in the facts.
These included efforts of the editor to verify the offensive statement,
absence of evidence indicating that the statement was unreliable,
and editing which toned down and made less offensive the remarks
about which the plaintiff complained. 0 7 Carson was construed as
99. Id. at 1466; see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
100. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1466
101. Id. at 1467-68; see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
102. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1469; see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
103. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1470; see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
104. Masson, 881 F.2d.
105. Id. at 1472.
106. Id. at 1471. Dunn was concerned with whether the use of the Spanish word
for "pigs" was a rational translation of a public figure's remarks about litterbugs. The
dissent here nofes that the plaintiff in Dunn failed because the Spanish word could be
construed as a fair translation and the plaintiff did not produce other evidence of actual
malice. In contrast, Malcolm was not translating from a foreign language and, in addi-
tion, even if the misquoted words alone were insufficient to infer malice, Masson
presented other evidence from which a jury could find that the alterations were not inad-
vertent and from which malice could be inferred. Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspa-
pers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
107. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1471-72. The dissent argued that Hotchner does not
support the proposition that writers may alter quotations of third persons to make their
comments more offensive or defamatory. In this case, unlike in Hotchner, the defendants
had adequate means at their disposal in the form of tapes to ensure the accuracy of the
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solidly supporting the plaintiff's argument that actual malice may be
inferred from fabricated quotations.' Bose Corp. and Pape were
not considered on point because "[w]hile Masson's meaning might
have been ambiguous, there was no ambiguity as to what words he
uttered."' 09
The dissent argued that an analysis of the basic first amendment
principles of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny is
required to formulate an appropriate basis for determining whether
altered quotations constitute libel."0 These principles include protec-
tion of both errors of fact and errors of judgment."' Based on the
premise that what is said is as much a fact as what is done, a jour-
nalist who negligently quotes inaccurately is protected because it is
an error of fact. However, a journalist who intentionally fabricates
quotations errs in judgment." 2 Accordingly, the dissent questioned
whether the policy of protecting errors of judgment is supported by
extending it to fabrication of quotations." 3
The dissent turned to the journalism profession for its answer. Re-
view of the relevant literature failed to reveal that "the right to dis-
tort quotes of real, identified people . . . is important to the proper
functioning of the press in a free society."" 4 Acknowledging that the
quotations and they failed to use those means to quote their subject accurately. See
Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hotchner v.
Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
108. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1472; see Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th
Cir. 1976); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
109. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1473; see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); see also
supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
110. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1473; see also supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
111. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1473. Errors of fact are those mistakes in accuracy aris-
ing from incomplete information, insufficient verification, incorrect conclusions, and other
similar causes. Errors of judgment are unfortunate choices of how to report events which
are susceptible to varying interpretations depending on one's perspective or
understanding.
112. Id. at 1473-74.
113. Id. at 1474. The implication appears to be that while the underlying first
amendment policy concern extends absolute protection to errors of fact, the protection of
errors of judgment may not be so broad. The analysis draws a distinction between an
author's judgment in choosing how to describe something and an author's judgment to
alter how someone else described something. The former is clearly protected in this view;
the latter may not be unless it has the same kind of importance to a "free and robust
press." Id.
114. Id. at 1478. The dissent made an extensive, if less than exhaustive, survey of
the literature. Sources cited included: M. V. CHARNLEY & B. CHARNLEY, REPORTING
(4th ed. 1979); J. L. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE
NEWS MEDIA (1976); J. L. HULTENG, PLAYING IT STRAIGHT: A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION
OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS
law is not determined by the standards of the profession, the dissent
nonetheless refused "to construe the first amendment as granting
journalists a privilege to engage in practices they themselves frown
upon, practices one of our defendants has flatly disowned as journal-
istic heresy." 115
A five-step inquiry was proposed by the dissent for resolving cases
involving fabricated quotations. The court should determine whether:
(1) the quotation purports to be verbatim; (2) the quotation is inac-
curate; (3) the inaccuracy is material; (4) the inaccuracy is defama-
tory; and (5) the inaccuracy is malicious."' A positive answer to
each of these questions would defeat a defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment; a negative answer to any one would require a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant."17 Applying the inquiry to
this case, the dissent concluded that the district court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment for the defendants. Malcolm used quotation
marks to indicate verbatim reporting." s8 Accuracy of the quotations
was subject to factual determination. 119 The alleged alterations could
be material. 120 The quotations could not be found nondefamatory as
a matter of law.'' And a jury reasonably could conclude that the
defendants were deliberate or reckless. 122
D. Analysis
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion assumed that the quotations at issue were
deliberately altered,' 23 but then argued that such deliberate altera-
tion failed to constitute actual malice. 24 The New York Times rule
allows recovery for defamatory falsehoods which are published either
(1981); S. KLAIDMAN & T. L. BEAKUCHAMP, THE VIRTUOUS JOURNALIST (1987); THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL (1982); J. OLEN, ETICS IN JOUR-
NAUISM (1988). The dissent also discussed a 1984 incident involving another writer for
The New Yorker, Alistair Road, who was widely criticized in journalistic circles after he
disclosed that he used composite characters in articles which were supposedly nonfiction.
Editor-in-chief of The New Yorker, William Shawn, who initially defended Reid, subse-
quently advised his staff by memorandum that the editors of the magazine did not con-
done Reid's actions. The memorandum stated that "'truth begins, journalistically, with
the facts.'" Masson, 881 F.2d at 1477.
115. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1478.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1478-79. "If the answer to any of these questions is no as a matter of
law, the inquiry stops and the defendant wins. If they could all be answered yes, I would
send the matter to the jury." Id.
118. Id. at 1479.
119. Id. at 1480.
120. Id. at 1481.
121. Id. at 1482.
122. Id. at 1484-86.
123. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1454.
124. Id. at 1456.
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with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their
falsity. 25 The Masson court avoided the falsity issue by casting the
actual malice test in terms of whether the plaintiff's actual remarks
were substantively altered by the quotations or whether the quota-
tions were rational interpretations of his comments. 126
Falsity has remained central to the constitutional issue in libel
suits since New York Times v. Sullivan.27 The majority's tests in
Masson have been used by other courts to determine whether de-
fendants published falsehoods knowingly or with reckless disregard
for truth. 28 However, tests for determining knowledge or reckless
disregard may not be dispositive, or even appropriate, when a court
begins by assuming deliberate alteration. In such a case, knowledge
of falsity is already established by the assumption of deliberate
alteration.
Accordingly, although actual malice may not turn on knowledge
of falsity in this case, it is an underlying premise which the court
acknowledged but then largely ignored. By focusing on whether an
inference of actual malice may require more than deliberate altera-
tion, the court appears to give a constitutional blessing to intentional
misquotation. Since the court began by assuming that the quotations
were untrue, its tests were really concerned with how much untruth
125. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see supra
notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
126. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456. If the majority had really assumed deliberate al-
teration of the facts of what was said, it would have had to acknowledge that the quota-
tions were falsehoods. The actual malice test would then be easy because it would be
concerned only with whether the alteration was, in fact, deliberate or reckless rather than
inadvertent.
127. R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS:
MYTH AND REALITY 183 (1987).
128. In Dunn the court was concerned with whether the Spanish word used in an
article was a rational interpretation of English language remarks. Dunn v. Gannett New
York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 1987). In Bose the court's concern
was whether the writer made a rational interpretation of the way sound was produced by
an electronic speaker. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 511 (1984). In Time the court attempted to determine whether the writer adopted a
rational interpretation of whether a report was merely allegations of a complainant or
had been adopted as factual by a government commission. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S.
279, 289 (1971). Only in Hotchner was the court concerned with defamatory effect, but
it found no reckless disregard of truth in an alteration which served to lessen the defama-
tory impact of a speaker's actual comments. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910,
914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834
(1977). Although Hotchner applied the alteration of substantive content test in the con-
text of defamatory effect, its purpose was to measure whether there was reckless disre-
gard for truth. The majority in Masson failed to draw this distinction and thereby gave
the impression that the absence of substantive alteration was the equivalent of absence of
falsity. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
is constitutionally permissible. The unresolved question is defama-
tory effect. The authority marshaled to support the court's opinion12
was less than convincing because most of those cases dealt with the
question of knowing or reckless falsehood rather than defamatory ef-
fect. As a result, they are distinguishable on their facts or, as the
dissent pointed out, they are contrary to the court's position. 130
The court's opinion failed to consider the salience of defamatory
effect in each of the quotations at issue. As a result, the court's mes-
sage was distorted when it said, "We cannot perceive any substan-
tive difference between the phrases 'it sounded better' and '[I] [sic]
just liked it.' "131 Its analysis conveys the impression that either the
court was unable to distinguish between accuracy in quotation and
similarity in quotation, or the court deemed misquotation relatively
unimportant. The court's prior acknowledgement of the deliberate
alteration is meaningless since it proceeded to equate similar lan-
guage with accurate quotation.
The court may not have intended to suggest that misquotation is
anything other than false representation of what was said. Nonethe-
less, the opinion is misleading at best because it confuses the test for
deliberate or reckless disregard for truth with the test for defama-
tory effect. The court indicates that, in its view, the test for libel is
no different when a writer uses quotation marks than when a writer
merely gives an impression of what was said. However, as the dissent
pointed out, the presence of editorial interpretation constitutes a sub-
stantive difference between direct quotation of a speaker's words and
narrative which merely purports to give the writer's impression of
what a speaker said." 2
Nowhere is the confusing effect of the court's analysis more ap-
parent than in applying the rational interpretation test to the phrase
"intellectual gigolo." First, the court said Masson may not have used
the phrase, but its attribution to him "did not alter the substantive
content of Masson's description of himself.' 33 Then, the court as-
serted that even if the quotation was inaccurate, it was not defama-
tory, and even if defamatory, it was not actionable under the incre-
mental harm theory.3 4
If Masson never called himself an "intellectual gigolo" and Mal-
129. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456; see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 289 (1979); Dunn v. Gan-
nett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 1987); Hotchner v. Cas-
tillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday
& Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text.
130. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1471-73 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1456.
132. Id. at 1465 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
133. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1457; see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
134. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1457-58.
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colm knew he never did (as the court had already assumed), 135 then
it is unquestionable that Malcolm deliberately or recklessly disre-
garded the truth. Assuming Malcolm knew that Masson never used
this expression and she deliberately misrepresented that he had used
it, her disregard of truth could fail to be libelous only if this false-
hood was not defamatory or not actionable under the incremental
harm theory. The court's argument that Malcolm's use of the phrase
was not a substantive alteration was irrelevant if the remark was
nondefamatory, or else it was just another way of describing incre-
mental harm. Deliberate or reckless use already had been conceded.
The only unresolved' issue was whether it was defamatory. If it was
not defamatory, there was no libel regardless of how deliberate or
reckless Malcolm may have been in communicating the falsehood.
The court merely confused the issue by agreeing with the district
court' that this phrase was a rational interpretation of Masson's
conversation."3 6
2. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent pointed out the problem inherent in the majority's
failure to recognize the substantive difference between purporting to
quote Masson's conversations and relating the author's impressions,
opinions, or even paraphrases of what he said.137 Nonetheless, the
dissent similarly failed to acknowledge the distinction between de-
famatory quotations and false quotations. Its discussion of the liter-
ary differences between quotations and paraphrases focused on the
unique character of quotations.138 The difference in what the reader
135. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 1457. The court's application of the incremental harm theory is mis-
placed as well. If the phrase is nondefamatory, the question of actual malice is moot. To
get to incremental harm, the court must find it defamatory and must also find the actual
malice factors of deliberate or reckless disregard of truth. Incremental harm applies only
if, in the contest, the untruth is less defamatory or, at least, no more defamatory than the
truth. Incremental harm is a bootstrap opposing argument when the plaintiff has alleged
many false and defamatory statements. Only if the others were unproven might this one
quotation be construed as not actionable because not constituting incremental harm. See
supra note 72.
137. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1465 (Kozinski, Jr., dissenting); see supra notes 91-93
and accompanying text.
138. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1465. The analysis pointed out, in particular, how words
reported to come from one's own mouth may be much more damaging to one's reputation
than words said by others or even the impressions of others. Because the reader believes
that the words reported are precisely those of the individual quoted, the reader's opinion
is formed in that belief. The reader may make a different kind of judgment if it is under-
stood that the words are the writer's interpretation of the substance or meaning of what
understands, depending on whether or not a statement is in quota-
tion marks, is critical in a case such as this. However, the reader's
understanding is important for determining defamatory effect rather
than for determining the truth or accuracy of what was written.
The dissent relied on the theory that freedom of the press does not
require a right to fabricate quotations.139 The theory is unpersuasive,
however, because the first amendment should not be understood by
the limits it imposes on speech and press but rather by its liberation
of speech and press. The question posed by this case is not whether
the first amendment requires a right to fabricate quotations, but
whether it protects such a right. The views and standards of thejournalism profession are no doubt important to the credibility of the
press. The understandings and conventions of the profession may
provide invaluable guidance for the courts on the question of what
quotation marks may reasonably signify to a reader. However, the
application of standards and ethics of the profession to the question
of legal liability for libel is a different matter.
Professional standards establish boundaries and constraints on
conduct which those who engage in the profession deem important
for the credibility, viability, and reputation of the profession. Those
constraints may be much narrower than the allowable limits of free
expression under the constitution. Quality professional journalism
may not require a right to fabricate quotations. Even so, it does not
necessarily follow, as the dissent urged, that the first amendment
does not extend protection to such behavior. 40 As the prior cases
show, libel is not established on the basis of either adherence to or
extreme departure from professional standards. 4' Accordingly, the
dissent's reliance on the ethics of professional journalists and educa-
tors was misplaced in determining the applicable legal standard.
If the standards of the journalism profession are not reliable
guides to legal precepts for determining liability for libel, the dis-
sent's five-step test for libel may be biased in favor of a more con-
servative standard than the first amendment would allow.' 42 The test
was said rather than what the individual actually said. See supra notes 94-98 and accom-
panying text.
139. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1464, 1478; see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying
text.
140. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1478; see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 13.
142. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. Analysis of the standards of
professional journalists led the dissent to its five-step inquiry to test for libel in cases
involving fabricated quotations. Determination of whether a quotation purports to be ver-
batim and whether it is accurate quotation is simply the basic falsity inquiry that must
be made when truth is urged as a defense to allegations of libel or any time actual malice
must be proved. The actual facts must be ascertained in any case before the question of
deliberate or reckless disregard of such facts can be raised. Materiality of the inaccuracy
of quotations is relevant for determining whether a statement is defamatory, but it may
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gives the appearance of a logically structured approach to answering
the summary judgment question. However, it may only give height-
ened importance to the question of accuracy at the expense of more
fundamental concerns. It may be more appropriate to consider the
accuracy question by inquiring into the basic issues of defamatory
effect and the constitutional safeguard of speech and press. The
"breathing space"' 43 needed for free expression may be unnecessa-
rily restricted by focusing too heavily on accuracy. The analysis is
more appropriately balanced if the court weighs the gravity of indi-
vidual injury against the threat to free expression.
IV. INTERPRETIVE ISSUES
A. Quotations as Facts
Although the court never precisely identified its view of quota-
tions, its analysis indicates that the court did not consider them as-
sertions of fact.4 Even the dissent was uncomfortable with such a
construction, viewing quotations as representations of the "speaker's
own words or something very close to them."'1 45 This discomfort led
the dissent to argue that the degree of accuracy required in quota-
tions is a question of journalistic judgment rather than journalistic
fact. 146 The majority chose its accuracy standard by following court
decisions which measured the truthfulness of translations and
'47interpretations. 4
Neither of these concepts is particularly useful in formulating a
legal standard. Journalistic judgment may be helpful, but it repre-
not be the only relevant factor.
143. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)); see supra notes 4-5 and accompanying
text.
144. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. One of the basic issues the
court faced was whether to treat quotations as assertions of fact. If quotations are under-
stood as assertions that an individual literally said the quoted words, then anything other
than verbatim reporting is falsehood. Had the court construed quotations in this manner,
the actual malice inquiry would have been complete when it made the assumption, for
purposes of the appeal, that the quotations were deliberately altered. The New York
Times test, knowledge of falsity, would have been satisfied by the assumption of deliber-
ate alteration.
145. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1464 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1474; see supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
147. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456; see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984); Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc.,
833 F.2d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 1987); see also supra notes 16-18, 21-22, 129 and accompa-
nying text.
sents only one side of the libel equation.148 Translations pose
problems of interpretation, usage, and context which are nonexistent
in quotations. Similarly, quotations do not present the problem of
interpretation of ambiguous events or remarks because they are, by
definition, reproductions or repetitions of the exact language of the
statements made. 149 Moreover, the Supreme Court has unequivocally
rejected the professional standards test,150
A more constructive approach for such cases is to apply an objec-
tive standard to determine how quotations are understood. Although
the standards of professional journalists shape the views of a reason-
able person, the two are not wholly aligned. An objective standard is
particularly appropriate in the case of libel because a fundamental
element of the claim is damage to reputation.' 51 Had the court ap-
plied this standard, it is unlikely that the court would have based its
decision on whether the quotations were rational interpretations of
what Masson actually said. A reasonable person is more likely to
have an understanding closer to the fundamental rule cited by the
dissent. Quotation marks are commonly understood to enclose words
"'exactly as the source gave them-verbatim.' ",152 The average per-
son is unlikely to condone editing that goes beyond the most minor
corrections of grammar or syntax as suggested by the Associated
Press Stylebook.15 3 Thus, the more controversial views of some jour-
nalists would not affect the standard. 54
B. Standards of Materiality
The dissent included the question of materiality in its proposed
five-step inquiry.155 This element addresses the effect of the writer's
148. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
149. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (5th ed. 1979); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 1168 (2d ed. 1972); THE MLA STYLE SHEET 5-7 (W. Parker comp. 1968).
150. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678,
2685 (1989); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
151. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 2 (1978). The baseline objective
standard for determining whether quotations are factually deficient would be what a rea-
sonable person understands quotation marks to mean. In a particular case, the test would
be how a reasonable person would interpret the use of quotations marks in the context,
152. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1474 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting M. V. CHAR-
NLEY & B. CHARNLEY, REPORTING 248 (4th ed. 1979)).
153. Id. at 1475. "[T]he AP style manual advises that '[q]uotations normally
should be corrected to avoid the errors in grammar and word usage that often occur
unnoticed when someone is speaking but are embarrassing in print.'" Id. (quoting THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL 184 (1982)).
154. Id. The dissent discusses views of some journalists who advocate "deliberate
improvements." The views of writers such as Malcolm and Reid (see supra note 115)
would also have to be considered in trying to settle on a standard accepted by the jour-
nalism profession.
155. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1478. The dissent conceptualized application of the ma-
teriality question in the context of sorting out whether an author's alteration of exact
words spoken by the subject was the correction of speech fragmentation and other com-
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changes on the accuracy of the quotation and asks whether the au-
thor misrepresented what the subject said. Applying this inquiry to
the defamation issue is more logically the starting point because if
the alterations are immaterial they can have no defamatory effect.156
In such circumstances, there is no reason to raise the question of
actual malice. Instead, the dispute is resolved at the defamation
stage.
Defamation, which developed as a common law tort claim, is now
codified in most states.151 The common law tort standard of materi-
ality for misrepresentation 5 8 is applicable in the defamation inquiry.
The court asks whether a reasonable person, in framing a judgment
of the speaker, would attach importance to the words misrepresented
or omitted. If so, the misrepresented or omitted words are material.
The inquiry then shifts to whether such misrepresentation or omis-
sion harmed the reputation or lowered the community estimation of
the speaker.159
The test for actual malice follows the defamation inquiry because
its purpose is to protect freedom of the press when liability for defa-
mation would otherwise be imposed. 6 ° If the author's alterations are
material in the defamation inquiry, the question of materiality is
raised again in determining whether there was actual malice. How-
ever, the question of materiality in this context involves a different
standard. Defamation is no longer involved because its essential ele-
ments are already established. Care must be taken not to confuse the
analysis by making another facial comparison of what was said as
opposed to what was quoted. Actual malice is an inquiry into the
mon verbal abuses. The correction of such characteristic errors of speech was considered
a commonly accepted and desirable practice. It did not embrace changing of words for
artistic effect or other reasons unrelated to the process of transcribing spoken conversa-
tion into readable conversation. See id. at 1475; see also supra notes 117 and 142 and
accompanying text.
156. If the difference between what was said and the way the author quoted it is
materially the same, the quotation cannot be defamatory becaiuse the author has not
interjected anything into it.
157. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 2 (1978); see also CAL. CIV.
CODE § 45 (West 1982); L. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF
LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 72 (1987).
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977).
159. See J. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 32 (1978); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF ToaTs § 559 (1977).
160. See L. FORER, supra note 157, at 74-78. Libel still requires the plaintiff to
prove the elements of the defamation claim: publication of a defamatory statement, the
statement concerned the plaintiff, and the plaintiff suffered injury to reputation as a re-
sult. However, when the defendant is a public figure, the constitutional concern for free-
dom of the press leads to the actual malice inquiry.
writer's subjective knowledge.161 Thus, actual malice is established if
the writer knew or was reckless as to whether his quotations were
materially different from what the subject actually said.
The question is how to judge whether the writer had such knowl-
edge. The standard of materiality in actual malice may be derived
from judicial application of the New York Times rule.162 The stan-
dard that runs through all the cases is that when the writer repre-
sents the work as factual, the writer is strictly liable for reporting
which is intentionally or recklessly inaccurate about facts known to
the writer. A different rule applies when the writer is expressing an
opinion or giving an interpretation. Quotation marks are not deter-
minative; liability depends on how the writer represents the quota-
tions. When they are represented as factual and accurate, a subjec-
tive standard of materiality applies. 16 3
161. See R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS:
MYTH AND REALITY 191 (1987). The writer's subjective knowledge is determinative of
fault. Essentially, defamation of a public figure is excusable as long as the defamation
was not false and the writer was not at fault for failing to ensure it was not false.
162. Where circumstances are unclear or what was said is unclear, an interpreta-
tion which is rational is acceptable. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971). If an author must
translate from one language to another, a rational interpretation is also acceptable. Dunn
v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987). Where an author
gives an impression of what the subject can be imagined to have said, it is necessary only
to convey clearly that the writer is expressing an opinion. Baker v. Los Angeles Herald
Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), cert. denied, 749
U.S. 1032 (1987).
The cases have applied a more demanding standard where an author represents that a
quotation is an accurate report of what the subject said. The quotation may be a com-
plete fiction if it is not defamatory. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977). However, if
it is defamatory fiction, the writer may not inaccurately replicate what the writer knows
was actually said with impunity. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr.
29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), disapproved on other grounds, McCoy v. Hearst
Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 846 n.9, 727 P.2d 711, 719 n.9, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518, 525-526 n.9
(1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (It is noteworthy that the court found that
the question of whether the work was fictional or not was a jury issue, but the question of
actual malice could be resolved strictly on the basis of whether the writer knew what
actually was said and inaccurately replicated it.). Falsely attributing statements amounts
to false statement of facts, and whether such falsity is present is a question of law. Sel-
leck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1985).
When quotations are wholly invented, actual malice is a jury question. Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). However, actual malice is more than failure to
comply with professional standards. The asserted facts (quotations in this case) must be
known to be false and must be published with reckless disregard of their falsity. Harte-
Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
163. The court asks whether the writer knew or should have known that the quota-
tions were not an accurate replication of what the subject actually said.
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C. Measuring Ambiguity and Substantial Alteration
The court noted that other courts have found alteration of quota-
tions acceptable under some circumstances.6 However, the court
failed to distinguish those circumstances where alteration was per-
missible from those where it was not. None of the cited cases upheld
a privilege to fabricate quotations if the subject's actual words were
unambiguous. In Hotchner-Puche the court refused to impose liabil-
ity because it found that the fabricated quotation lessened the de-
famatory content of a statement that was not defamatory in any
event.16 5 The case is significant because it reaffirmed that falsity is
presumed but not dispositive of libel.166
Defamatory effect is the central issue in libel. Falsity becomes an
issue only when truth is raised as an affirmative defense or when the
constitutional protection of freedom of the press is at issue . 67 A
statement of fact, if true, cannot be defamatory, no matter how inju-
rious to reputation. 6  Liability is not imposed for libel of a public
figure, regardless of falsity, unless published with knowledge or reck-
less disregard of the falsity-that is, actual malice. 6 9
The cases relied on by the court apply the rational interpretation
standard when a writer expresses opinions about what someone did
or said. Some of the cases address whether the writer adequately
alerted the readers that they were reading opinion or fiction rather
than fact.1 Others were concerned with how much leeway a writer
164. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1455-56; see also supra notes 56-60 and accompanying
text.
165. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.
Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834, 914 (1977).
166. See R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS:
MYTH AND REALITY 183-84 (1987).
167. See id. Proof of falsity has been interpreted as an essential requirement to
show knowledge or reckless disregard of truth.
168. See R. PHELPS & E. D. HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS AND RESPONSIBILI-
TIES 106-08 (1978).
Truth is the greatest of all defenses. There is no finer hour for a newsman than,
when hauled before a court on a libel charge, he replies, in effect, to the plain-
tiff, "Yes, I libeled you, and I'm glad. I would do it all over again, exactly as I
did before, because what I said was true and the public ought to know what a
scoundrel you are."
Id. at 106.
169. The New York Times requirement. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying
text.
170. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Exam-
iner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1032 (1987); Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 212 Cal. Rptr.
838 (1985); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied,
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has in interpretation of language or events.171 In each of these con-
texts, the other courts agreed that interpretive freedom extends to
what is rational as an opinion of another's meaning. The cases do not
grant a writer wide latitude to make alterations when conveying
facts. Rather, they uniformly suggest, and some specifically indi-
cate,1712 that there is no margin for interpretation when a writer
presents factual material.
V. GOOD LAW AND ETHICS IN JOURNALISM
A. Applying Standards-Professional or Legal
It is unnecessary to make the choice between standards acceptable
to journalists and the court's rational interpretation standard. No
baseline is imaginable for understanding a quotation's meaning un-
less reference is made to the conventions of professional writers. The
understanding of readers is shaped by their familiarity with the com-
mon practices of journalists, as well as by their own education. How-
ever, standards of journalists are unreliable guides to legal standards
for libel because of the inherent conflict between injury to reputation
and freedom of the press. This particular conflict is what the actual
malice rule addresses. The press is protected by requiring clear and
convincing evidence of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
truth. The public cannot rely on the press to restrain itself from
abuses any more than any other institution can be relied upon to
police itself.
B. Substance versus Accuracy
The balance between the conflicting interests of individuals and
the press remains best determined by placing the decision of whether
fabricated quotations are defamatory in the hands of the jury. The
court erred in this case in finding no actual malice as a matter of
law. The court's error resulted from its failure to allow the jury to
determine the question of defamatory effect. The court also erred by
applying a broad materiality standard to judge the accuracy of the
quotations. Summary judgment was inappropriate because a mate-
rial question of fact existed as to whether a reasonable person would
444 U.S. 984 (1979), disapproved on other grounds, McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d
835, 846 n.9, 727 P.2d 711, 719, n.9, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518, 525-526 n.9 (1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
171. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984);
Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
172. Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 212 Cal. Rptr.
838 (1985); Bindrim v: Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 984 (1979), disapproved on other grounds, McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d
835, 846 n.9, 727 P.2d 711, 719 n.9, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518, 525-526 n.9 (1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
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attach importance to the alterations in the quotations. If it found the
differences material, the jury could have decided whether the differ-
ence were damaging to Masson's reputation.
The court was entitled to find no actual malice, as a matter of law,
only if a reasonable jury could not have found that the quotations
were materially altered to the detriment of Masson's reputation. It
may well have done so if clear and convincing evidence was not pro-
duced to show that Malcolm knew the quotations were materially
altered. However, by simply finding that the quotations were rational
interpretations of what was said, the court did not proceed in this
manner. Such a finding avoided the writer's representation of the
quotations as factual replications of conversations rather than as in-
terpretations. The court also misapplied the actual malice test to the
facts rather than to the issue of knowledge of the facts.
C. The Right to Fictionalize the Facts
The court's opinion does not endorse or grant a right to fictionalize
facts. Neither does it necessarily endorse fabrication of quotations.
Rather, it is best understood as an attempt to reinforce the principle
that falsehoods, even libelous ones, are nonetheless entitled to some
protection under the first amendment. New York Times and its prog-
eny certainly indicate that a free press is unable to operate effec-
tively (and to criticize public figures) if it is held liable for errors of
fact. However, this court's application of the rational interpretation
test to quotations seems to suggest that journalists are free to change
facts either to suit their literary taste or for dramatic effect. The
only constraint apparently is whether a judge could believe that their
version of the facts is one of a number of rational interpretations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court's decision to resolve the case on an actual malice basis
was flawed. It should have decided the defamation issue first. If the
case could have been disposed of on the grounds that the quotations
were not defamatory, then it was unnecessary to reach the constitu-
tional issue of actual malice. On the other hand, if the quotations
were materially different from Masson's statements and the effect
was defamatory, then the actual malice test was required. However,
the inquiry should then have focused on the writer's subjective
knowledge of the material alteration.
By deciding the actual malice question, the court reached a con-
clusion that lies are constitutionally protected as long as they are
little lies. The test for actual malice does not provide such a range of
truthfulness. It is concerned only with knowledge of truthfulness.
Liberty to intentionally misrepresent facts and damage reputations
was surely not intended by the Supreme Court when it fashioned the
actual malice test. When a writer knows that reported facts are
false, or the purported quotations are not accurate, the constitution
is no shield if the result is defamatory. The press has neither a con-
stitutional nor a moral right to inflict harm by intentional untruth.
That question was settled, if it was ever in doubt, by the Supreme
Court's definition of such actions as actual malice. When the courts
protect conscious lies which cause injury, the press ceases to have
freedom and begins to have license.
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